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This suggests that the continuing weakness in
California is not a symptom of a slow recovery
throughout the nation. Instead, California appears
to be suffering from lingering regional problems,
especially defense and aerospace cutbacks and
weakness in commercial real estate (see Sherwood-
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Why the Fed cannot target regions
The problem of regionally oriented monetary pol-
icy can be analyzed using aframework developed
by international economists to study the effects
of international trade in financial assets on the
power of monetary and fiscal policies. Instead of
focusing on financial flows across countries, we
focus on financial flows across states. When
viewed in this context, California has two special
features. First, there are no barriers to the flow of
financial assets across state borders, so investors
will buy a security wherever it offers the highest
yield. Second, since California uses the same
currency as the rest of the nation, its exchange
rate with respect to the other states is irrevocably
fixed at one; that is, you can always trade Califor-
nia dollars for New York dollars one for one.
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In a recent editorial, a prominent West Coast
newspaper suggested that the Federal Reserve's
decision to tighten monetary policy was prema-
ture, partly on the grounds that the California
economy remains weak. It pointed out that al-
though the economy in other parts ofthe country
is doing quite well, the recovery in California
continues to lag behind, and it suggested that the
Fed should have kept interest rates low in order
to address this regional imbalance.
The editorial raises the question what role mone-
tary policy should play in responding to regional
recessions. This Weekly Letter discusses some
basic principles ofthe theory of regional stabi-
lization policy. First, it explains why the Federal
Reserve System cannot engage in region-specific
monetary policies. Second, it discusses the prob-
lems associated with a policy ofsystematically
easing whenever some region ofthe country ex-
periences a local recession. Finally, itexplains
why fiscal policy is better suited to the problem
of regional stabilization.
The recovery in California
and across the nation
First, we consider whether the continuing weak-
ness in California represents a local problem or
reflects a general weakness in the national econ-
omy. Figure 1 shows three measures ofthe civil-
ian unemployment rate for the period since 1989:
one for the United States, another for California,
and a third for all states except California. While
the recession in California began around the
same time as the national recession, the recovery
in California started later than the national recov-
ery and has proceeded at a slower rate. Unem-
ployment rates for the nation as a whole and for
the U.S. excluding California began falling in the
middle of1992 and are now in the vicinity of the
"natural rate" of unemployment (which is the
long-term unemployment rate around which the
economy fluctuates and which economists esti-
mate to be somewhere around 6 to 6.75 per-
cent). In California, however, the unemployment
rate peaked near the end of 1992 and has fallen
only gradually since then.FRBSF
Since there are no barriers to the flow of finan-
cial assets across states, interest rates on securi-
ties are equalized across locations within the
u.s. For example, in the market for u.s. Treasury
bills, investors can choose between brokers in
San Francisco and New York. The transactions
costs of trading in the two markets are essentially
the same, so this will not affect the choice of
where to buy the security. Bills sold in New York
are denominated in the same currency and
backed by the same government as those sold in
San Francisco, so inflation and sovereign risk will
not affect the choice of the location. Finally, the
exchange rate between New York dollars and
California dollars is irrevocably fixed at one, so
exchange risk will not affect the choice of loca-
tion. If brokers in New York quoted a lower yield
than brokers in San Francisco, investors would
sell bills in New York and buy them in San Fran-
cisco. This would reduce the yield on bills sold
in San Francisco and increase the yield on bills
sold in New York. Investors would continue this
operation until the yields were equalized.
The same principle applies to monetary policy.
The Federal Reserve influences credit conditions
primarily through transactions in the market for
bank reserves. On any given day, individual
banks may be above or below their desired re-
serve positions. Since reserves do not earn inter-
est, banks that have a surplus will lend to banks
that have a deficit. The yield on reserve lending
is known as the federal funds rate, and it adjusts
to equate supply and demand for loans. When
the Federal Reserve wants interest rates to rise, it
reduces the aggregate quantity of bank reserves,
and this puts upward pressure on the federal
funds rate. But like all other interest rates, the
federal funds rate must be equalized across loca-
tions within the U.S. If the federal funds rate were
lower in San Francisco than in New York, banks
would borrow less expensive reserves in San
Francisco and lend them at a profit in New York.
This would put upward pressure on the federal
funds ratein San Francisco and downward pres-
sure on the federal funds rate in New York. Banks
would continue this operation until the federal
funds rates in San Francisco and New York were
the same. Thus, interest rate equalization across
locations within the U.S. implies that the Federal
Reserve cannot conduct region-specific monetary
policies.
This means that monetary policy is a blunt in-
strument. The Federal Reserve cannot simultane-
ously ease credit conditions in California while
taking a neutral stance in the Midwest, where
local economies are booming. If the Federal Re-
serve wanted to ease credit conditions in Cal-
ifornia, it would have to ease credit conditions
throughout the rest of the nation as well. This
might improve conditions in California, but it
would also generate inflationary pressures in
much of the rest of the country, where unemploy-
ment is already near the natural rate. Monetary
policy would be an appropriate instrument if
the weakness in California were a symptom of
weaknessthroughout the national economy. But
California is lagging far behind the rest ofthe
economy.
Inflationary bias of regionally oriented
monetary policy
Furthermore, consider the consequences of a
policy of systematically easing whenever any
state is in recession. The problem with a policy
ofthis kind is that in a heterogenous multire-
gional economy such as the United States, there
is almost always some state that is experiencing
bad times, even when the national economy is
doing well. To illustrate this, we collected data
on unemployment rates in the largest 20 states
(measured by the size of the labor force) over the
period 1978 to 1994. For each month in the sam-
ple, we ranked the states according to their un-
employment rates, and then we graphed the
unemployment rate in the weakest state. The
results ar~ shown in Figure 2, along with the
national unemployment rate. The shaded areas
mark the dates of recessions, as determined by
the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Figure 2 shows that there is often some state that
has high unemployment even when the national
economy is not in recession. If the Federal Re-
serve System were to ease credit conditions
whenever some state had high unemployment, it
would almost always be easing. Although a mon-
etary expansion might increase output and em-
ployment in the weak region, it would aggravate
inflationary pressures in the strong ones. Hence,
a policy of this kind would produce a significant
inflationary bias.
If California had its own currency and flexible ex-
change rates with respect to the rest of the U.S.,
it could conduct its own independent monetary
policy, just as other countries do. For example,
when the Bank of Canada lowers its bank rate,
the Canadian dollar depreciates relative to the
U.S. dollar. This reduces the price of Canadian
goods relative to U.s. goods and shifts aggregate
demand from the U.S. to Canada. To our knowl-
edge, no one has proposed that California issue
its own currency or establish its own central
bank.Sherwood-Call, Carolyn. 1993. "Whither California?"
FRBSF Weekly Letter (August 8).
Cromwell, Brian. 1994. "California Recession and
Recovery:' FRBSF Weekly Letter (April 29).
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier and Jeffrey Sachs. 1992. "Fiscal
Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence
for Europe from the United States:' Working Paper
No. 632, Center for Economic Policy Research
(March).
booming regions, so the federal government
automatically transfers resources from strong to
weak regions. Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Jeffrey
Sachs (1992) estimate that a one dollar reduction
in a state's income results in a 34 cent reduction
in federal tax payments and a 6 cent increase in
federal transfer receipts. Thus the federal govern-
ment absorbs roughly 40 percent of the fall in
regional income. Since this operates primarily
through the federal tax system, the policy is fully
automatic and does not require discretionary






State governments also can try to stabilize re-
gional incomes by increasing spending during
local recessions and cutting back during local
booms. This is likely to be less effective than fed-
eral fiscal policy because individual states have
to finance a spending increase by raising their
own taxes. On the other hand, under the federal
system, tax reductions and spending increases in
weak states are partially financed by tax reve-
nues from other regions. Even so, state level fis-
cal policy is a more flexible instrument than
monetary policy.
Conclusion
While a monetary expansion might reduce
unemployment in weak regions, it would also
aggravate inflationary pressure in strong ones.
Systematic use of monetary policy for regional
stabilization would therefore impart an inflation-
ary bias in an economy with many heterogenous
regions. Fiscal policy does not suffer from this
inflationary bias, since the fiscal authorities can
simultaneously expand in weak regions and
contract in strong ones. Hence the problem of





In fact, the federal government already provides
an important source of insurance against re-
gional income shocks. When one part ofthe
country experiences a local recession, its federal
tax payments fall and its federal transfer receipts
rise. These receipts include payments to state
and local governments, social security benefits,
food stamps, and supplementary secondary in-
come payments, among others. At the same time,
tax payments rise and transfer receipts fall in
This means that fiscal policy can be targeted to
specific regions. Unlike the Federal Reserve, state
and federal fiscal authorities can simultaneously
expand in some regions whiIe contracting in oth-
ers. Thus, fiscal efforts at regional stabilization do
not suffer from the inflationary bias that plagues
monetary policy.
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Regional fiscal policy
Although open capital flows among states frus-
trate regionally oriented monetary policy, they
enhance regionally oriented fiscal policy. For
example, ifCalifornia were to undertake a fiscal
expansion, local credit demands would increase.
In the absence of capital flows, local interest
rates would also increase, and some investment
projects would be crowded out. But since capi-
tal is highly mobile across states, an expansion
in California would attract capital from other
parts of the country, and this would reduce the
degree to which local investment projects are
crowded out.
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The FRBSF Weekly Letter appears on an abbreviated schedule in June, July, August, and December.